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DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: THE SAME OLD
POLICY IN A NEW UNIFORM?
On February 28, 1994, the "Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the
Armed Forces" Act became law.' A memorandum issued by the Secre-
tary of Defense explained the new act by stating that no one applying to
the military "will be asked about his or her sexual orientation."2 This
new policy, referred to as "Don't ask, Don't tell, ' 3 is a result of President
Clinton's campaign promise to lift the ban on homosexuals serving in the
military.4 The President's promise, however, fell apart in the face of
tough opposition from both Congress and the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of
Staff.5 Accordingly, the new policy differs very little from the policy it
replaces.
6
Part I of this Comment examines the history of the ban on homosexu-
als in the military and compares the new "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy
with the policy that it has replaced. Because the ban does not exist in a
vacuum, Part II discusses the origins of sexual orientation and its role in
human sexual relations. Part III discusses criticisms of and challenges to
the ban on homosexuals in the military. Part IV examines the constitu-
tionality of excluding homosexuals from the service based on evidence
indicating a biological basis for sexual orientation. This Comment con-
cludes with a forecast of the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy should the
issue reach the Supreme Court.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1670 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. V 1993)).
2. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on Implementation of DoD
Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Les As-
pin Memorandum] (on file with The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
"The directive makes clear that no one will be asked about his or her sexual orientation as
part of the accession process, although homosexual conduct may be a basis for rejection for
enlistment, appointment and induction." Id
3. See Kathryn Wexler, ROTC Still Draws Protests, but Issue Now Is Bias Against
Gay Students, WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1994, at A3.
4. Chandler Burr, Friendly Fire, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 98; see also Rowan Scarborough, Doman: No More Women in Combat;
Fiery Conservative Revels in GOP Win, WASH. Tnims, Feb. 4, 1995, at A5 ("'Don't ask,
don't tell is the best. It's 98 percent' of the original ban, Mr. Dornan said .... ").
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I. THE BAN ON HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
A. History of the Ban
As early as 1778, the United States military was discharging servicemen
on the basis of homosexuality.7 After a court-martial presided over by
Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Burr, Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin
was discharged from the Army on March 11, 1778, by an order of General
George Washington.8 The first regulations specifically banning homosex-
uals from service were enacted in 1942.1 These regulations declared that
"'persons habitually or occasionally engaged in homosexual or other per-
verse sexual practices' were 'unsuitable for military service." ' 10 Since
that time, application of the regulations has vacillated between strict and
liberal, depending upon the manpower needs of the military at a particu-
lar time."
While some believe that "the great majority of homosexuals who serve
in the military are never detected at all,"'" approximately 17,000 service-
men (an annual average of about 1,500) were discharged from the mili-
tary between 1980 and 1990 on the basis of "homosexuality."' 3 This
constitutes nearly 1.6% of the average number of involuntary discharges
for those years.' 4 The cost for these discharges ranged from approxi-
7. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMINo: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILI-
TARY 11-12 (1993).
8. Id. "Some observers have suggested that Enslin's sentence is evidence that Wash-
ington held a lenient view of homosexuality, since such transgressions could have been
punishable by imprisonment or even death in the conventions of the day." 1d. at 12.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 16-17; see also Major Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals:
Scientific, Historical and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REv. 55, 72-79 (1991) (discussing
the history of homosexuals in the Armed Forces).
11. SHiLTs, supra note 7, at 17. The policy in 1945, for example, was either to court-
martial homosexuals or to hospitalize homosexuals deemed to be "'reclaimable."' Davis,
supra note 10, at 75. The policy changed in 1946 to allow honorable discharges for enlisted
personnel who were being discharged for homosexuality but had not committed any sexual
offense while in service. Officers were permitted to resign under honorable conditions. Id.
This changed again in 1948 as the provision for honorable discharge was removed and
"[h]omosexuals were to be tried by court-martial or separated as unfit with an undesirable
discharge." Id. In 1955, certain homosexuals could, again, get an honorable discharge. Id.
at 76. In 1982, the Department of Defense issued a directive ordering total exclusion of all
personnel fitting the definition of a homosexual. Id. at 79. That was the last major change
in the policy regarding homosexuals in the service until the implementation of the "Don't
ask, Don't tell" policy. Id
12. Davis, supra note 10, at 69.
13. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DoD's POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY 4 (1992)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
14. Id. at 16.
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mately $28,226 per discharged enlisted personnel to $120,772 per dis-
charged officer for the fiscal year 1990.15
Just as implementation of the regulations has shifted over the years,' 6
so to has the rationale for the ban on homosexuals.' 7 "National security"
was the rationale advanced during the anti-Communist McCarthy era.
1 8
More recently, that rationale was replaced by the need to preserve "good
order, discipline and morale." 19
The use of national security as a rationale for banning homosexuals in
the military had to be abandoned when two reports, one by the Navy20
and the other prepared by the Department of Defense's ("DoD") De-
fense Personnel Security Research and Education Center (PER-
SEREC),21 concluded that homosexuals pose no more of a security risk
to the military than do heterosexuals. 2 The PERSEREC report found
no evidence that sexual orientation affects an individual's suitability for
military service. 3 Although the DoD has backed away from security
concerns as a rationale for the policy of excluding homosexuals from ser-
vice, it continues to support the policy with the rationale that exclusion is
"needed to maintain good order and discipline."'24
B. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Compared to Former Policy
The "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy differs little from the old policy. 
5
15. Id. at 4. These costs reflect the costs associated with initial training and replace-
ment of troops discharged and do not reflect the total costs which would have to include
costs for out-processing and court costs. Id.




20. THE CRITTENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE BOARD APPOINTED TO PREPARE AND
SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR THE REVISION OF
POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND DnRcnvas DEALING WITH HOMOSEXUALS, Dec. 12, 1956 -
Mar. 15, 1957 [hereinafter CRrrTENDEN REPORT].
21. THEODORE R. SARmIN, PH.D., HOMOSEXUALITY AND PERSONNEL SECURITY, De-
fense Personnel Security Research and Education Center (PERSEREC), PERS-TR-91-
008 (1991) [hereinafter PERSEREC].
22. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 30.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 5; see also Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Edwin Dom
on Briefing Armed Forces Applicants app. (not dated) (on file with The Journal of Con-
temporary Health Law and Policy) (stating that it is a "requirement for military units and
their members to possess high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and cohe-
sion"). "[H]omosexual conduct is grounds for discharge from the Armed Forces." Id
25. See Scarborough, supra note 6, at A5; see also Art Pine, Few Benefit From New
Military Policy on Gays, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at Al, A14 (stating that "the new policy
1995]
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"The services are continuing to throw out gay men and lesbians at about
the same rate as they did before the new policy evolved. '26 Under the
former policy, there were three grounds for discharging a servicemember
for homosexuality: a statement, an act, or a marriage or attempt to marry
someone of the same sex." Under the new policy, however, a ser-
vicemember may not be questioned about his or her sexual orientation or
homosexual conduct unless there is "independent evidence" of homosex-
ual conduct or a statement by the servicemember that he or she is a ho-
mosexual or bisexual.28 While this policy does not bar military service
based on sexual orientation, it does bar service based on homosexual con-
duct.29 Homosexual conduct is defined in the new policy as "a homosex-
ual act, a statement . . . that demonstrates a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted
marriage.,
30
appears to be producing few real changes or benefits for any of those involved-particu-
larly for homosexuals").
26. Pine, supra note 25, at A14. Furthermore, Pine has stated:
The number of service members being discharged for homosexuality has been
declining in recent years, but with the size of the armed forces shrinking, the
proportion for the overall military remains about the same, Pentagon figures
show. Critics complain that the totals do not include cases in which commanders
deal with cases by forcing gay men and lesbians out of the service on unrelated
charges or by denying them the opportunity to re-enlist.
27. KATHERINE BOURDONNAY ET AL, FIGHTING BACK: LESBIAN AND GAY DRAFT,
MILITARY AND VETERAN ISSUES 19 (Joseph Schuman & Kathleen Gilberd eds., 1985)
[hereinafter FIGHTING BACK].
28. Department of Defense Directive 1304.26, Enclosure 2, Qualification Standards
for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction § B.8.a. (1993) [hereinafter DoD Dir. 1304.26,
Enclosure 2].
29. See id.; 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); Les Aspin Memorandum, supra note
2.
30. DoD Dir. 1304.26, Enclosure 2, supra note 28, at § B.8.b.; 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)
(Supp. V 1993). Another difference is that:
Unlike the old policy, the new directive imposes a rebuttable presumption on
servicemembers who say they are gay. The presumption is that servicemembers
who make such statements engage in, have a propensity to engage in, or intend to
engage in homosexual acts. The regulations place the burden of disproving this
presumption on servicemembers.
Memorandum from Servicemembers Legal Defense Network to Edwin Dorn, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, and Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
regarding Analysis: New Pentagon Policy on Gays in the Military, at 3 (Jan. 27, 1994)
[hereinafter SLDN Memorandum] (on file with The Journal of Contemporary Health Law
and Policy). The Servicemembers Legal Defense Network ("SLDN"), founded in 1993, is
a non-profit organization that works to find legal representation for members of the armed
services who face investigation and discharge from the military because of their sexual
orientation. En Banc Brief for Amici Curiae National Lesbian and Gay Law Association
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The new policy merely combines the old grounds for dismissal into a
single definition of homosexual conduct. Furthermore, while a ser-
vicemember may not be questioned about his or her sexual orientation
unless "independent evidence" exists of homosexual conduct (under the
new, expansive definition of conduct), "[t]here is no definition of 'in-.
dependent evidence' or any requirement that this evidence be true or
credible."31
The "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy actually seems to relax the grounds
for dismissing homosexuals. For example, the old policy defined a "ho-
mosexual act" as "'bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively per-
mitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying
sexual desires."' 32 The new policy, however, retains that definition and
adds a second part: "any bodily contact that a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act de-
scribed in subparagraph (i) [Le., the original definition of homosexual
act]."33 This "reasonable person" standard expands the former definition
far beyond an act committed for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.
Counsel working with servicemembers affected by the new policy have
found that "[w]hat matters is someone else's perception of an activity, not
whether one is actually gay or engaging in an activity for the purpose of
sexual gratification." 4 Under this more expansive definition, "any physi-
cal touch, even if platonic, as well as a wide variety of statements and
behaviors could be construed as homosexual in nature. '35 Finally, the
"Don't ask, Don't tell" policy is a misnomer because it does not really
forbid the military to ask a servicemember about his or her sexual orien-
tation. Rather, it allows questioning if "independent evidence," which
remains undefined under the new policy, exists.
II. ORIGINS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
While the military has been discharging servicemembers because of
their sexual orientation, the scientific community has been moving for-
ward with studies suggesting a biological role in human sexuality.36 In
and Servicemember's Legal Defense Network at 1-2, Steffan v. Aspin, 1994 U.S. App.
LExis 9977 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 91-5409) [hereinafter Brief for Amid Curiae].
31. SLDN Memorandum, supra note 30, at 2.
32. FIGHTIG BACK, supra note 27, at 19.
33. DoD Dir. 1304.26, Enclosure 2, supra note 28, at § B.8.b(1)(d)(ii).
34. SLDN Memorandum, supra note 30, at 4.
35. Id.
36. See generally William A. Henry III, Born Gay?, TimE, July 26, 1993, at 36; Sharon
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1948, biologist Alfred C. Kinsey identified, through a nine-year case study
of human sexuality, that. thirty-seven percent of the male population has
had some homosexual experience after entering adolescence.3 7 Since
Kinsey's report, other researchers have published studies on human sexu-
ality, including Masters and Johnson3 8 and a recently completed study by
Edward Laumann. a9
According to the most recent study, 2.7% of men and 1.3% of women
reported having had sex with someone of the same gender in the past
year. 0 Other random-population studies in the United States, Germany,
and Canada have reported that as few as 0.3% and as many as 6.2% of
men identify themselves as homosexual. 41 A study by Dean Hamer, chief
of the Section on Gene Structure and Regulation at the National Cancer
Institute, found a two percent "population incidence of male
homosexuality."42
Biological causes of homosexuality have also been addressed by re-
searchers. Studies have identified biological differences between homo-
sexual and heterosexual men.43 One study, by neuroanatomist Simon
LeVay, found a significant difference between the size of the hypothala-
mus of homosexual and heterosexual men.44 Other scientists have found
differences between the size of other brain structures.4 5 "[These] find-
ing[s] indicate[] that.., sexual orientation has a biological substrate."46
Begley & Mary Hager, Does DNA Make Some Men Gay?, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1993, at 59
(providing reports of this research in the popular press).
37. ALFRED C. KINSEY Er AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948).
38. WILLIAM MASTERS ET AL., MASTERS AND JOHNSON ON SEX AND HUMAN LOVING
(1986).
39. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALrrY: SEX-
UAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); see also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Now for the
Truth About Americans and Sex, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 63 (discussing results of this study).
40. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 39. at 64. These figures should be compared to 6.2% of
men and 4.4% of women who report that they are sexually attracted to people of the same
gender. Id. at 68. The discrepancy between those who are attracted and those who act on
that attraction may be attributable to a number of factors. For example, as the study re-
ports, AIDS has changed the way some people conduct their sex lives. Id. at 68-70.
41. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR
THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 99 (1994).
42. Id. at 101.
43. See id. at 159-63 (providing a discussion of these studies).
44. Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034, 1034 (1991).
45. See HAMER & COPELArD, supra note 41, at 163 (citing a Netherlands study which
identified another structure of the brain, the suprachiasmatic nucleus, as differing in size
between homosexual and heterosexual men).
46. LeVay, supra note 44, at 1034.
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The most recent search for a biological underpinning for sexual orien-
tation found "evidence that one form of male homosexuality is preferen-
tially transmitted through the maternal side and is genetically linked to
the chromosomal region Xq28. '47 Using male subjects who identified
themselves as homosexual, this study found an increased rate of same-sex
orientation among the subject's maternal uncles and male cousins, but
not among their fathers or paternal relatives.' This suggests the possibil-
ity of genetic transmission in a segment of the homosexual population.49
The study also performed a deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") analysis on a
population of families that had two homosexual brothers whose homo-
sexuality was not transmitted through their fathers or to females in the
family. In thirty-three out of forty of these sibling pairs, both brothers
had inherited genetic information in the chromosomal region Xq28.50
The study reported a confidence level of more than ninety-nine percent
and thus concluded, "it appears that Xq28 contains a gene that contrib-
utes to homosexual orientation in males."
5'
The results of this study have begun to influence courts in cases where
homosexuals are discriminated against because of their sexuality. The
District Court of the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, in
Evans v. Romer, 2 subpoenaed the author of the study, Dean Hamer, to
testify in the legal challenge to Amendment Two, an amendment "prohib-
iting the State from giving homosexuals protected status or claims of dis-
crimination before the law."53  The presiding judge, in finding
Amendment Two unconstitutional, wrote, "[t]he preponderance of credi-
ble evidence suggests that there is a biologic or genetic 'component' of
sexual orientation.
'54
Dr. Hamer suggests that lawyers representing homosexuals will rely on
scientific findings of a biological role in sexual orientation. 5 He reports
47. Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321, 325 (1993).
48. Id. at 321, 326.
49. Id. at 321.
50. Id. at 325.
51. Id.
52. Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719, at 77,939 (Colo. D.C. Dec.
14, 1993).
53. HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 41, at 210.
54. Evans, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719, at 77,939; see also Equality Founda-
tion of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,420 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding, based on
other expert testimony, that "[s]exual orientation is set in at a very early age ... and is not
only involuntary, but is unamenable to change").
55. HAMER & COPELArD, supra note 41, at 212.
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that lawyers have said that "they will continue to press the immutability
argument in cases of... military policy.., because it has become an
integral part of civil-rights law."
' 56
III. CirriCISMS AND CHALLENGES TO THE MILITARY BAN ON
HOMOSEXUALS
A. Criticisms
The DoD's policy excluding homosexuals from service, both before
and after "Don't ask, Don't tell," has been criticized and challenged.
5 7
Specifically, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psycho-
logical Association, and the American Bar Association have expressed
disagreement with the policy. 8 Studies commissioned by the DoD, itself,
have also criticized the military's policy.59 For example, The Crittenden
Report,60 submitted to the Secretary of the Navy in 1957,61 found that
homosexuals were no more of a security risk than other groups and that
"there have been many documented instances of individuals who have
reported themselves as having homosexual tendencies and who nonethe-
less have continued on duty and served honorably and well."'62 The De-
fense Personnel Security Research and Education Center issued another
report reiterating The Crittenden Report's finding that homosexuals
posed no security risk, per se.6 It also found "no evidence that... sexual
56. L
57. See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 30, at 11 n.2 (listing 16 citations to state-
ments made by military figures "urging an end to the ban and dismissing the notion that
the presence of gay men and lesbians in the military impedes the functioning of the serv-
ices in any way"). See generally HoMosnxuALrrY AND THE MimrriAY: A SOURCEBOOK OF
OFFICIAL, UNCENSORED U.S. GovRNimENu Docurm-rrs (not dated) (containing reports
by the DoD, polling data, and other information from both sides of the debate on homo-
sexuals in the military).
58. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 36. "The [American Psychiatric] Association's
1973 position on homosexuality and homosexuals in the military was that 'homosexuality
per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or voca-
tional capabilities."' Id. The American Psychological Association resolved in 1975 to sup-
port the position of the American Psychiatric Association "by also opposing the exclusion
and dismissal of persons from the armed services on the basis of sexual orientation." Id;
SHItS, supra note 7, at 690.
59. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 29-35.
60. THE CRrrTNDEN REPORT, supra note 20. The report gets its name from the
Chairman of the Board appointed to prepare and submit recommendations to the Secre-
tary of the Navy for the revision of policies, procedures, and directives dealing with homo-
sexuals. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 29.
61. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 29.
62. Id
63. Id at 31.
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orientation affects an individual's suitability for military service," 64 and
recommended further research on the subject.65
Other critics of the policy have compared it to the military's exclusion
of African-Americans prior to President Truman's integration of the mili-
tary in 1948.66 Some judges have commented on this comparison in their
decisions.67 For example, Judge Hatter, in his opinion in Meinhold v.
United States,6" commented: "The Department of Defense's justifications
for its policy banning gays and lesbians from military service are based on
cultural myths and false stereotypes. These justifications are baseless and
very similar to the reasons offered to keep the military racially segregated
in the 1940's. ' 69
A further criticism of the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy is that it
amounts to sexism.70 The "institutionalized sexual harassment of military
women through 'lesbian-baiting'-the practice of pressuring and harass-
ing women through calling, or threatening to call them, lesbians" is seen
as an informal barrier which "prevent[s] full recognition of women's con-
tributions in job fields ... open to them."' 71 In addition to these criti-
cisms, both inside and outside the military, the policy of excluding
homosexuals from military service has been challenged in the courts.7'
B. Court Challenges
Until recently, the military's policy against homosexuals had routinely
64. Id.
65. Id, at 33.
66. See generally David Bianco, Echoes of Prejudice: A Comparison of the ArgumentsOpposing Military Racial Integration with the Arguments Opposing Allowing Gays andLesbians to Serve Openly (Dec. 15, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, available from TheHuman Rights Campaign Fund, 1012 14th St., N.W., Ste. 607, Washington, D.C. 20005).67. See, eg., Meinhold v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1993), staygranted in part, denied in part, 114 S. Ct. 394 (1993), and affd in part, rev'd in part, 34 F.3d1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (providing that the "justifications for banning gays and lesbians frommilitary service are based on cultural myths and false stereotypes"); Selland v. Aspin, 832F. Supp. 12, 14 n.1 (D.D.C. 1993) (comparing burden borne by commanders for policeharassment of homosexuals with that borne by commanders after the inclusion of blacks
and women in the armed forces).
68. 808 F. Supp. 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also discussion infra part III.B.1.
69. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1458.
70. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in NontraditionalJob Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
215, 232-33 (1990).
71. Id. at 216.
72. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 46-53 (highlighting seven cases as"[elxamples of [e]xpulsions for [wihich [p]erformance [w]as [njot an [i]ssue").
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been upheld by the courts through "judicial deference" to the military's
judgment.73 In 1991, however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in Pruitt v. Cheney,7 4 stated that it would not defer to
the military and uphold "its regulation without a record to support its
rational basis."'75 This meant that the Department of Justice, arguing for
the military, would have to provide a factual basis to justify the policy.
76
1. Meinhold v. United States
77
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
followed the Pruitt decision in Meinhold v. United States.78 The Meinhold
court, citing Pruitt, stated that "the Court cannot merely defer to the 'mil-
itary judgment' as the rationale for the policy-the Court must consider
the factual basis underlying the 'military judgment."'
79
In 1980, seventeen-year-old Volker Keith Meinhold enlisted in the
Navy."° In his twelve years of service, he was, "by [the] Navy's own ad-
mission, one of its very best airborne sonar analysts and instructors."'
Meinhold was rated in the top ten percent of all Navy instructors when
the Navy initiated discharge proceedings against him on the basis of his
sexual orientation in 1992.81
The Navy was aware of Meinhold's sexual orientation because he had
"publicly acknowledged his gay orientation to various Navy representa-
tives, including senior officers." 3 Indeed, he was "sufficiently open
about his sexual orientation that his status became common knowledge
within his unit."84 Nonetheless, the Navy initiated discharge proceedings
against Meinhold immediately after he acknowledged that he was a ho-
73. Burr, supra note 4, at 54, 55.
74. 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
75. Id. at 1167; see also Melinda S. Cooper, Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation in
Military and Security Contexts: An Analysis of Recent Federal Decisions, 3 L. & SEXUALrrY
201, 226 (1993).
76. Burr, supra note 4, at 55. But see GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 28 ("According
to DoD, the courts have not required scientific evidence to support DoD's policy.").
77. 808 F. Supp. 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1992), summary judgment granted, 808 F. Supp. 1455
(C.D. Cal.), stay granted in part, denied in part, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993), and affd in part, rev'd
in part, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
78. See id at 1457.
79. Id. at 1457.
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mosexual on a national news program."5 He was discharged from the
Navy within three months.
8 6
Meinhold sought a preliminary injunction against the Navy requesting
immediate reinstatement.8 7 The district court ordered Meinhold rein-
stated.88 In its amended opinion, the court enjoined the "Department of
Defense ... from discharging or denying enlistment to any person based
on sexual orientation in the absence of sexual conduct which interferes
with the military mission of the armed forces of the United States." 9
Upon the Solicitor General's application for a stay, the Supreme Court
stayed the district court's order granting "relief to persons other than Vol-
ker Keith Meinhold... pending disposition of the appeal by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." 90 This decision allowed
Meinhold to continue on active duty.
Both the appellate court in Pruitt and the district court in Meinhold
based their decisions upon equal protection challenges to the policy.91 In
Meinhold, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision as to
Meinhold.92 However, the Ninth Circuit found that it did not need to
address the equal protection argument and, instead, based its decision on
a different interpretation of the policy.
93
The appellate court reasoned that the DoD could exclude persons
based upon homosexual conduct.9" The court, however, found that
"[c]onstruing the regulation to apply to the 'classification of being homo-
sexual' [would] clearly implicate[ ] equal protection" violations as it did in
Pruitt.95 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit followed the "cardinal rule that





89. Id at 1458.
90. Meinhold, 114 S. Ct. at 374.
91. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1457; Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1167.
92. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1480.
93. Id at 1476.
94. Id. at 1477.
95. I d; see also Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Consti-
tutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHToN L. REv. 384 (1994) (discussing the
"status versus conduct" distinction). "[Tjhe [Supreme Court] cases show that the status/
conduct distinction actually has two components. The first component is the substance of
the rule itself: Punishment and discrimination must be based on conduct, not status. The
second component is evidentiary: Status itself cannot be used as the 'evidence' of conduct."
Id. at 386.
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the constitutional problem may be avoided., 96 Accordingly, the court
construed the regulation to require discharge only when a statement of
homosexuality shows a "concrete, fixed, or expressed desire to commit
homosexual acts despite their being prohibited., 97 The court found that
Meinhold's statement, "'I am in fact gay,"' did not manifest that desire.
98
Surprisingly, the government did not appeal to the full panel of the Ninth
Circuit, leaving intact the circuit court's order reinstating Meinhold. 99
This decision appears to indicate that the Clinton Administration is
choosing not to defend the old policy-a policy that "'they can say is not
theirs.""100
2. Cammermeyer v. Aspin' 01
The story of Margarethe Cammermeyer, a former colonel in the Wash-
ington State National Guard," 2 is well-known, having been told in a
made-for-TV movie.103 Cammermeyer entered the Army Student Nurse
Corps in 1961 and served in the Army until 1986, with the exception of a
four year period when she was forced to resign because of pregnancy. 04
In 1986, Cammermeyer transferred to the Washington State National
Guard where she served until she was discharged on June 11, 1992.105
Canimermeyer's service in the Army and the Washington State National
Guard has been described as "remarkable."' 1 6 In fact, she received a
Bronze Star for distinguished service in Vietnam, among other "numer-
ous awards and distinctions.'
10 7
Cammermeyer applied for admission to the Army War College to re-
96. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476 (citing New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 582 n.22 (1979)).
97. Id. at 1479.
98. Id.
99. Eric Schmitt, Juggling Policy on Gay Troops: Clinton Administration Caught Up in
Appeals of Old'and New, N.Y. T.ms, Oct. 18, 1994, at B8.
100. Id (quoting Chai Feldblum, a Georgetown University law professor who was legal
director of the Campaign for Military Service, a coalition of gay rights groups lobbying to
lift the ban on homosexuals in the military).
101. 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
102. Id. at 910.
103. See Sue Carswell, An Officer and a Gentlewoman, OUr, Feb. 1995, at 56, 56 ("Un-
fazed by public perception, Glenn Close takes the dramatic lead in the movie version of
Colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer's life story.").
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ceive training to become Chief Nurse of the National Guard Bureau.
108
During a security check required for admission to the Army War College,
Cammermeyer was asked about her sexual orientation and she replied
that she was a lesbian. 10 9 Despite her admission, "Cammermeyer was
told by the Washington State National Guard that she could continue to
serve as Chief Nurse, and that the Guard would not pursue her discharge
'unless forced to do so' by the Department of the Army.t
110
Six months later, the United States Army began proceedings to with-
draw Cammermeyer's federal recognition. 1' These proceedings would
make "her ineligible to serve in the Washington State National Guard or
any other branch of the military."" 2 Former Chief Nurse of the National
Guard Bureau, Colonel Patsy Thompson, presided over Cammermeyer's
Federal Recognition Board. She "openly regretted her 'sad duty' of read-
ing the Board's adverse recommendation to 'one of the great Americans'
... [and] ... stated that Cammermeyer 'has consistently provided superb
leadership and has many outstanding accomplishments to her credit.""' 3
On June 11, 1992, Cammermeyer received an honorable discharge based
upon the Board's recommendation. 114 According to the court, she is "be-
lieved to be the highest ranking officer in any service of the U.S. Armed
Forces to have been discharged because of homosexual status."1 5
Cammermeyer brought a declaratory judgment action against the gov-
ernment claiming that her discharge violated her right to equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 1 6 The
108. Id.
109. Id. at 912-13.
110. Id. at 913 (quoting Cammermeyer Deci. at 18).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting the Tr. of Hearing before Federal Recognition Board, Vol. 2, at 131-
33).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 913 n.6.
116. Id. at 912. Cammermeyer also claimed her discharge "violated her right to privacy
under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution, her substantive
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and her right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment." Id. She also claimed that the Army regulation under which she
was discharged was an "invalid exercise of executive power violative of the constitutional
separation of powers, and that the regulation violates principles of federalism." Id. The
court addressed at length Cammermeyer's equal protection claim. Id. at 914-26. It also
addressed her substantive due process and First Amendment claims. Id. at 926-29. The
court found merit in her equal protection and substantive due process claims. Id. at 926,
928. The court granted summary judgment to defendants on Cammermeyer's First Amend-
ment claim, finding that "every court that has addressed this issue has refused to grant
relief on First Amendment grounds." Id. at 929. The court "construe[d] [Cammermeyer]'s
1995]
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court found that Canmermeyer "was discharged from the National
Guard pursuant to a governmental policy that is based solely on preju-
dice. ' '117 Furthermore, the court stated that "[p]rejudice, whether
founded on unsubstantiated fears, cultural myths, stereotypes or errone-
ous assumptions, cannot be the basis for a discriminatory classifica-
tion."118 The court granted Cammermeyer's motion for summary
judgment on her equal protection and substantive due process claims"19
and entered an order "requiring defendants to reinstate her to her former
position in the Washington State National Guard and to restore to her all
rights, honors and privileges of that status.' 20  The government has
appealed.
121
failure to respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment on [the invalid exercise of
executive power and principles of federalism] as a concession that these claims are without
merit and ... grant[ed] defendants' motion as to these claims." Id.
117. Id. at 929.
118. Id. (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1995)).
119. Id.
120. Id. The order, in full, stated:
a. For an order requiring defendants to reinstate her to her former position in
the Washington State National Guard and to restore to her all rights, honors and
privileges of that status;
b. For an order requiring defendants to expunge all record of plaintiff's sexual
orientation and her statements, if any, regarding same from any and all records in
defendants' possession;
c. For an order enjoining defendants from taking any adverse action against
plaintiff by reason of her homosexual status or on account of statements of her
homosexual orientation;
d. For an order enjoining defendants from taking any action against plaintiff
based on the purported authority of directives or regulations mandating separa-
tion from military service by reason of homosexual status or on account of state-
ments of homosexual orientation;
e. For a declaration that defendants' action in separating plaintiff from military
service based solely on her declaration of homosexual orientation was
unconstitutional;
f. For a declaration that defendants' regulation mandating separation from ser-
vice by reason of homosexual status or on account of statements of homosexual
orientation is unconstitutional; and
g. Costs of suit.
Id.
121. See Carswell, supra note 103, at 59. Oral arguments are scheduled for the fall of
1995. Memorandum from C. Dixon Osburn & Michelle Benecke titled "Update on Mili-
tary Cases and Discharge Proceedings" at 11 (July 1995) [hereinafter Update] (on file with
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
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3. Steffan v. Cheney' 22
Joseph Steffan was consistently ranked near the top of his class at the
Naval Academy (the "Academy"). 23 He enrolled in the Academy in
1983 and successfully completed three years of training.'24 During the
fall of his senior year, Steffan confided that he was a homosexual and had
relations with two fellow midshipmen.125 This conversation was reported
to Academy officials and, as a result, the Naval Investigative Service be-
gan an investigation into Steffan's homosexuality. 26
A meeting of the Academy Performance Board was convened on
March 24, 1987.127 At that meeting, Steffan was asked if he was "'a ho-
mosexual,"' to which he replied, "'yes."" '  The Performance Board rec-
ommended to the Commandant of the Academy that "'Steffan be
separated from the Naval Academy due to insufficient aptitude for com-
missioned service."" 29 The Commandant accepted the recommendation
and forwarded it to the Academic Board which met on April 1, 1987, and
"voted to recommend Steffan's discharge from the Academy to the Sec-
retary of the Navy.
130
Following a meeting of the Academic Board, Steffan was offered a
choice between submitting a "'qualified resignation"' or risk discharge. 3'
Steffan chose to resign and the Secretary of the Navy accepted his resig-
nation on May 28, 1987.132 On December 9, 1988, Steffan wrote to the
Secretary of the Navy, requesting the withdrawal of his resignation and
122. 733 F. Supp. 115 (D.D.C.), later proceeding, 733 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd,
920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990), summary judgment granted, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, en banc, reh'g, en banc,
granted, 1994 U.S. App. Lrxis 9977 (D.C. Cir.), and aff'd, sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).






129. Id. Navy regulations provide that homosexuality "'severely limit[s] a midship-
man's aptitude and potential for commissioned service."' Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 116
(quoting United States Naval Academy Regulations, J 12010.3.4 (rev. 1978)).
130. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 683.
131. Id. "'Resigned"' would appear on Steffan's transcript rather than "'Discharged"'
if he submitted a qualified resignation. Id. However, the qualified resignation included an
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his return to the Academy. 33 The Secretary, upon recommendation of
the Superintendent of the Academy, denied Steffan's request and Steffan
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.' 4
Steffan alleged that the Academy had violated his "constitutional rights
to free speech and association, due process, and equal protection."'31 Af-
ter finding that Steffan had "pled sufficient facts to defeat a motion to
dismiss for want of standing,"' 3 6 a dispute arose during discovery over the
issue of homosexual conduct.'3 7 During a deposition, Steffan refused to
answer questions concerning whether he had ever engaged in "homosex-
ual acts.' 38 The court found that "whether [Steffan] had engaged in ho-
mosexual conduct was the 'key' question in th[e] case."' 9 The court
dismissed Steffan's suit because he refused to answer the questions 40 and
Steffan appealed.' 4 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ("D.C. Circuit") reversed the district court's decision, finding that the
Navy's decision to seek Steffan's discharge from the Naval Academy was
"based on his admissions that he is a homosexual rather than on any evi-
dence of misconduct."' 42 Since Steffan's conduct was not a basis for the
Navy's decision, the conduct was not relevant to the suit.' 43 The D.C.
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case
for further proceedings."44
On remand, the district court granted the defendant's motion for sum-
133. Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 117.
134. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684; Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 117.
135. Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 115-16.
136. If. at 119. Defendants (the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Superintendent of the Naval Academy, and the Commandant of Midshipmen) argued that
Steffan's voluntary resignation deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction and that
the "action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the complaint does not
adequately allege that [Steffan]'s resignation was involuntary." Id. at 117.
137. Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 122.
138. I1& at 123. Steffan did deny having engaged in homosexual acts prior to entering
the Naval Academy. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 122.
141. Steffan, 920 F.2d at 75.
142. Id. at 75 (quoting Steffan, 733 F. Supp. at 124).
143. Id. at 76.
144. Id. At one point during the subsequent proceedings, Steffan sought to have the
court recuse itself after Judge Gasch referred to Steffan as a "homo." Steffan v. Cheney,
No. 88-3669(OG), 1991 U.S. Dist. Laxis 4852 at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1991). Judge Gasch
wrote that he meant no offense by the use of the word and that its use was insufficient to
lead an average person to question the court's impartiality. Id. at *14.
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mary judgment.1 4 In its conclusion, the court stated:
The Department of Defense's regulations that prohibit homo-
sexuals from serving in the Navy and the other armed services
establish classifications that rationally further legitimate state
purposes. Those purposes include the maintenance of disci-
pline, morale, good order, a respected system of rank and com-
mand, a healthy military force, morality and respect for the
privacy interests of both officers and the enlisted. [Steffan] is
not a member of a suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny.
Under the deferential standard of rational basis review, coupled
with judicial deference to the military and the legislature, the
regulations in question are not violative of the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment.1
46
Once again, Steffan appealed. 14 7 The D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court and ordered that Steffan be (1) awarded his diploma from the Na-
val Academy, (2) reinstated to military service, and (3) commissioned as
an officer.' 48 The court found that the Navy's actions forcing Steffan to
resign solely because he admitted his homosexual orientation were not
rationally related to any legitimate goal.'49 Therefore, the court decided
that the military's policy was based only upon prejudice and the "consti-
tutional requirement of equal protection forbids the government to disad-
vantage a class based solely upon irrational prejudice, whatever the
145. Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 2.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Steffan, 8 F.3d at 61.
148. Id at 70.
149. Id. The court came up with an interesting hypothetical to show that the military's
assertion that the discharge was based on conduct alone (with a statement being evidence
of conduct), and not on status, was incorrect:
[I]magine that two servicemembers engage in homosexual conduct. One is homo-
sexual by orientation-that is, he "desires" to engage in homosexual acts. The
other is heterosexual-that is, although he did engage in a homosexual act on this
occasion, it was a departure from his usual practice and he does not "desire" to
engage in any more such acts. Both servicemembers admit their conduct to their
superiors; both truthfully represent their sexual orientations.... tIhe homosex-
ual servicemember will be discharged-period. . . . [T]he heterosexual ser-
vicemember stands a good chance of remaining in the military....
. Whether the servicemember has engaged in homosexual conduct or has
stated that he is a homosexual, he can escape dismissal by showing that he is a
heterosexual. But he can never escape dismissal, once he truthfully admits his
orientation or his conduct, if he "desires" to engage in homosexual acts. The
Directives thus attack status, not conduct; and the status they are after is defined
only by one's thoughts.
Id, at 65.
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standard of review."' 50
After both a judge of the court, sua sponte, and the military requested a
hearing en banc, the judgment of the circuit court was vacated and a re-
hearing was granted. 5' The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court,
holding Steffan's discharge from the Naval Academy constitutional.'5 2
Finding that the Navy could discharge a servicemember based on his
homosexual conduct,' 53 the court stated that "the military may reason-
ably assume that when a member states that he is a homosexual, that
member means that he either engages or is likely to engage in homosex-
ual conduct.,' 54 In reaching its decision, the court criticized the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Meinhold,155 finding that the Ninth Circuit had mis-
characterized the "class of persons at issue."' 56 Steffan decided not to
appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision,5 7 thereby leaving a conffict between
the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit in Meinhold.158
4. Able v. United States'
5 9
Pruitt, Meinhold, Cammermeyer, and Steffan are challenges which
arose under the military's policy concerning homosexuality before the im-
plementation of the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy.
160
150. Id at 70 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-50
(1985)).
151. Steffan, No. 91-5409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXas 9977, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994).
152. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 699.
153. Id at 687. Steffan conceded this much, as well. Id. at 685.
154. Id at 686.
155. See discussion supra part llI.B.1.
156. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 687 n.7.
The Ninth Circuit accepted Meinhold's characterization that the class of persons
at issue was those "who say they are gay but have not acted in accordance with
their propensity in the past." In our view, however, the proper characterization
of the class is persons who say they are gay, but as to whom the military has no
additional evidence as to their conduct.
Id
157. See Update, supra note 121, at 20. Steffan's case is reported under the section of
the memorandum titled, "Cases Challenging Military Policy on Homosexuality, Final Deci-
sions," id at 17, and states "Steffan did not seek certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court," id at 20.
158. See Toni Locy, Appeals Court Backs Expulsion of Homosexual Midshipman,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 23, 1994, at A2 ("In a 7 to 3 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed a year-old ruling by a three-judge panel and broke with other federal
courts across the country that have considered similar issues.").
159. 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y.), motion to vacate denied, 863 F. Supp. 112
(E.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 870 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), remanded, 44 F.3d 128 (2d
Cir.), and 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
160. The appellate court, in Meinhold, specifically noted that the regulations have since
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The new policy has also been challenged in court.161 On March 30,
1995, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in
Able v. United States, ruled that the new policy violates an individual's
freedom of speech under the First Amendment and equal protection
rights under the Fifth Amendment. 162
The plaintiffs in Able are six homosexual members of the Armed
Forces.163 Upon initiating a legal challenge to the policy, the command-
ing officer notified plaintiff Robert S. Heigl that an administrative dis-
charge "by reason of [u]nsuitability [d]ue to [h]omosexuality" was being
recommended. 164 The court concluded that the United States was pre-
liminarily enjoined "from investigating or discharging or taking other ad-
verse or punitive action against plaintiffs based on their self-identification
as gay or lesbian.,
1 65
The DoD then informed the plaintiffs that it planned to initiate dis-
charge proceedings against two of the other plaintiffs, Sergeant Spencer
and Seaman Zehr.' 66 These discharge proceedings were to be based
upon statements made outside of the suit where they identified them-
selves as homosexuals. 67 The plaintiffs sought a second injunction.' 68
The district court granted a second order "enjoining defendants 'from in-
vestigating, discharging or taking other adverse or punitive action, pursu-
ant to the Act and/or Regulations, against plaintiffs based on their self-
identification as lesbian or gay."
'" 69
The DoD appealed both orders to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.1 70 The Second Circuit considered only the narrow
issue of the "proper standard in deciding [whether or not] to issue the two
preliminary injunctions.' 7 1 The court found that "[w]here the moving
been changed and expressed no opinion regarding the new policy. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at
1472" n.2.
161. See Update supra note 121, at 2-10. The section of the memorandum titled "Fed-
eral Cases Challenging Military's Policy on Homosexuality, New Regulations Cases" iden-
tifies six cases challenging the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy. Id. at 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9.
Three other cases being prepared for filing, are also identified. Id at 4, 6, and 10.
162. Able, 880 F. Supp. 968, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Update, supra note 121, at 2.
163. Able, 847 F. Supp. at 1038.
164. Id at 1041.
165. Id at 1045.
166. Able, 44 F.3d at 130.
167. Id.
168. Id
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party seeks to stay government action taken in the public interest pursu-
ant to a statutory or regulatory scheme," they must establish a likelihood
of success on the merits in addition to irreparable harm if the injunction is
not granted. 172 The district court applied a less rigorous standard, suffi-
ciently "'serious questions going to the merits,"' rather than a likelihood
of success on the merits.
173
The Second Circuit, rather than applying the "'likelihood of success"'
standard on its own, remanded to the district court for determination of
the higher standard. 74 The Second Circuit allowed the injunctions to re-
main in place pending resolution of the issue, "lest plaintiffs lose alto-
gether the opportunity to litigate their facial constitutional challenges in
the case's present posture."'175 The court required that the preliminary
injunction hearing be consolidated with a trial on the merits of a perma-
nent injunction. 76 The preliminary injunction orders were to remain in
effect "until March 31, 1995 upon which date they [were to] expire unless
reentered by the district court following a trial on the merits of plaintiffs'
request for a permanent injunction.' 77
On March 30, 1995, the district court found that the policy and the
directives implementing the regulations violated the "First and Fifth
Amendments and enjoin[ed] defendants from enforcing them against
plaintiffs.' 8 In reaching its decision, the court focused on subsection
(b)(2) 179 of the regulations and found two pertinent aspects: "It provides
for the discharge of a member because he or she (1) has made a 'state-
172. Id at 131 (quoting Plaza Health Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.
1989)).
173. Iat at 130 (quoting Able, 847 F. Supp. at 1038).
174. Id. at 132 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988); 11 Wmomr & Miuta-R, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvEL § 2962, at 638).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 133.
178. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 980.
179. Subsection (b)(2) reads:
(b) Policy-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of
the following findings is made and approved in accordance set forth in such
regulations:
i2) That member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words
to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made and approved in accordance
with procedures set forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated
that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a pro-
pensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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ment' and (2) the statement is of his or her status, that is, his or her 'pro-
pensity."'1 0 The court found that "a mere statement of homosexual
orientation is not sufficient proof of intent to commit acts as to justify the
initiation of discharge proceedings,"1 and held the regulation invalid
under the First Amendment. 8 2 The court also found that defendants did
not make the required showing that the policy is "'tailored to serve a
substantial governmental interest,' " 8 3 and therefore, the regulation vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" The gov-
ernment has appealed the decision to the Second Circuit. 8 1
5. Lieutenant Zoe Dunning
Lieutenant Zoe Dunning is a 1985 graduate of the Naval Academy
with an M.B.A. from Stanford University.8 6 She acknowledged her sex-
ual orientation at a rally in support of President Clinton's pledge to end
the ban on homosexuals in the military. As a result, her commanding
officer recommended her discharge." 7 Dunning's administrative board
met on June 9, 1993, and recommended an honorable discharge. Dun-
ning requested that the Secretary of Defense investigate possible im-
proper command influence in her administrative board.188 As a result,
Dunning faced a second board. 18 9
In a surprising decision, the administrative board recommended Dun-
ning's retention in the Navy.190 The board's recommendation will go to
the Naval Bureau of Personnel, which will make a recommendation to
the Secretary of the Navy.' 9' The Secretary of the Navy will make the
180. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 972 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993)).
181. Id at 976.
182. Id at 980.
183. Id (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)).
184. Id
185. Update, supra note 121, at 2.
186. Interview with Michelle Benecke and Dixon Osburn, Co-chairs of the Ser-




190. Tribunal Urges Navy Not To Discharge Lesbian, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1994, at A25;
see also Navy Board Backs Lesbian, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 1994, at A14 ("In a surprising
decision, a Navy tribunal decided yesterday that Lt. Zoe Dunning's career in the Reserves
should not end with the statement 'I am a lesbian."'); Reynolds Holding, Debate on Gays
in Military is Headed for Supreme Court, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 3, 1994, at A6 ("A Navy
panel's recommendation Thursday to keep Zoe Dunning in the naval reserve was an unex-
pected victory for gays and lesbians in the military. . .
191. Holding, supra note 190, at A6.
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final decision whether or not to retain or discharge Dunning." m The
board found that Dunning's statement was not a proclamation of her "in-
tentions to practice homosexuality, but merely [an] indicat[ion of] her
sexual orientation."' 93 This is the first time a military board has sided
with an openly homosexual person.
1 94
IV. THE BAN, BIOLOGY, AND THE COURTS
In announcing the new policy on homosexuals in the military, President
Clinton said: "There is no study.., showing [homosexuals] to be less
capable or more prone to misconduct than heterosexual soldiers."' 95 In-
deed, the President could have cited to the military's own studies that
show homosexuals to be as capable as heterosexual soldiers.' 96
The Supreme Court has devised three levels of scrutiny for equal pro-
tection challenges to state action: 197 (1) strict scrutiny for discrimination
based on race, alienage, or national origin (i.e., a "suspect class");198 (2)
heightened review for discrimination based on gender or illegitimacy;'
99
and (3) rational basis review for discrimination based on other classifica-
tions.200 Strict scrutiny requires the state action to be "suitably tailored
to serve a compelling state interest." 0' 1 Heightened review requires the
action to be "'substantially related to a legitimate state interest."' 22 Ra-
tional basis simply requires that the "classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 20 3
Even under rational basis, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, the mili-
tary must show that its discrimination against homosexuals is based on a
rational means to meet a legitimate government interest.20 4 The interest
that the military has advanced to justify its policy, "good order, discipline
and morale," is contradicted by the court decisions already in place. The
192. See id.
193. Navy Board Backs Lesbian, supra note 190, at A14.
194. Id.
195. Burr, supra note 4, at 98 (quoting Clinton's announcement on CNN).
196. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text; see also PERSEREC, supra note 21,
at iii ("Few data have been put forward to support the belief that being homosexual predis-
poses a person to unreliability, disloyalty, or untrustworthiness.").
197. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
198. Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 440-41.
200. Id. at 440.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 441 (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 45 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
203. Id. at 440.
204. Id.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell
decisions of the courts in Meinhold, Cammermeyer, and Able, and the
decision of the board in Dunning's case, indicate that openly homosexual
persons are serving in the military. The Cammermeyer court found it
"ironic that after over three years as an acknowledged homosexual ser-
vicemember, Cammermeyer was evaluated as having 'the potential to as-
sume responsibility at N[ational] G[uard] B[ureau] Level as Chief Nurse,'
yet she was discharged because of the alleged incompatibility of her sex-
ual orientation with military service."
205
The quality of service provided by openly homosexual persons under-
mines the military's position that a ban on homosexuals is necessary to
maintain "good order, discipline and morale." Moreover, evidence sug-
gesting a biological role in the determination of sexual orientation20 6 may
lead to an equal protection argument based on homosexuality as an "im-
mutable characteristic., 207 If this argument is successful, the military
would be confronted with a greater burden (i.e., strict scrutiny) in justify-
ing exclusion of homosexuals from the service.
V. CONCLUSION
There is disagreement among the federal courts as to the constitution-
ality of the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy. The Ninth Circuit, in
Meinhold, found the statement, "I am in fact gay," insufficient to show a
concrete desire to commit homosexual acts. The district court, in Able,
likewise found that a statement was insufficient to show intent to commit
homosexual acts. Conversely, the D.C. Circuit in Steffan found that a
statement is sufficient to show homosexual conduct, and that the military
may discharge a servicemember based upon conduct as evidenced by a
statement. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit found that such treatment did
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, while the
Ninth Circuit found that construing the regulation to apply to the classifi-
cation of being homosexual would implicate equal protection. The dis-
205. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 926.
206. See discussion supra part H; see also HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 41, at 212
("As long as opponents of gay rights continue to argue that homosexuality is a 'choice,' gay
activists likely will continue to quote scientific findings of a biological role in sexual
orientation.").
207. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990). One requirement for a group to be found to be a "suspect" class triggering
strict scrutiny, or a "quasi-suspect" class triggering heightened scrutiny, is to "exhibit obvi-
ous, immutable or distinguishing characteristics." Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587, 602-03 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
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trict court, in Cammenneyer, found that the policy is based solely on
prejudice and cannot stand.
Because of the disparity among the lower courts, the possibility exists
that the constitutionality of the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy will be de-
cided by the Supreme Court. How the Court will rule on the issue is not
clear. The Court has held that homosexual conduct is not a fundamental
right under due process.2"' It has, however, found that criminal laws
based upon one's sexual orientation are unconstitutional." 9 Further-
more, the court has said that discrimination must not be based on
prejudices or reactions of some faction of the population. 10
The Court has yet to consider whether homosexuality may be consid-
ered a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny under an equal protection
analysis.211 The evidence of a biological "cause" of homosexuality, how-
ever, may lead to an equal protection argument based on homosexuality
as an "immutable characteristic." If successful, this argument would re-
quire the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the military's policy concerning
homosexuals. The high quality of service of openly homosexual persons
serving in the military, coupled with biological evidence as to the origins
of homosexuality, may tip the balance in favor of greater protection for
homosexual servicemembers.
Alan N. Yount, RN
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